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BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING
We contended here before and we contend here again
that it was error in the Court below to permit the defendants' expert witnesses to arrive at the "market value" of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

the land taken by multiplying the yards of material by a
given price and adding the obtained sum to the claimed
values of other component parts of the estate. We are at
a complete loss to comprehend the statement of your petitioners when they say that, "* * * no such supposed
error [s] was advanced by the plaintiff * * * in the
record on appeal * * * or covered by the points argued
on appeal * * *." We have strongly contended throughout that it was not proper to multiply the number of tons
of estimated material by a given price per unit and to add
the amount obtained thereby to other claimed items of
damage to arrive at market value. This is exactly what
petitioners' expert witnesses did do--and did admit doing.

"* * * the evidence of defendants' experts
shows with abundant clearness that they arrived at
their determination of the value of the lands in question by multiplying the estimate * * * as to
the tons of sand and gravel in place by the estimated
value per ton." (Opinion of the Court.)
Your petitioners cannot successfully contend otherwise.
STATEMENT OF POINT
POINT I.
THE LANDOWNER IN DEALING WITH A
PARCEL OF LAND ON WHICH THERE IS
MINERAL MAY NOT ESTABLISH FAIR MARKET VALUE BY EXPERT TESTIMONY BY
WHICH THE EXPERT MULTIPLIES THE
GROSS MATERIAL PRESENT BY THE MARKET VALUE PER UNIT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LANDOWNER IN DEALING WITH A
PARCEL OF LAND ON WHICH THERE IS
MINERAL MAY NOT ESTABLISH FAIR MARKET VALUE BY EXPERT TESTIMONY BY
WHICH THE EXPERT MULTIPLIES THE
GROSS MATERIAL PRESENT BY THE MARKET VALUE PER UNIT.
Petitioners return to this Court with complete renewed
reliance upon the case of National Brick Co. v. United
States, 76 U. S. App. D. C. 329, 131 Fed. 2d 30; the case
is reproduced in toto in their brief. We submit that the law,
logic and reasoning in the decision of this Honorable Court
heretofore rendered in this cause is susceptible to a more
certain defense against assault than the holdfng of the case,
supra, upon which petitioners seek this rehearing. In fairness we think that petitioners should have called to the
Court's attention the more recent authority, United States
v. Land in Dry Bed of Rosamond Lake, Cal., et al., (July
1956) 143 Fed. Supp. 314. This case discusses the National
Brick Co. case as well as numerous others which have concerned themselves with the issues here. We think that these
more recent holdings clearly sustain our contention that this
Court has ruled correctly; the petition for rehearing should
be denied.

United States v. Land in Dry Bed of Rosamond Lake,
Cal., et al., supra, was an action concerning lands lying in
a dry lake bed which were taken by the government through
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eminent domain. The issue was fair market value. The
condemnee contending that the land's best use was for
mining sites for the production of rotary clay used in oil
drilling. Said the Court:

"* * * The question now arises on trial, as
to what testin1ony the experts for the landowners
may give.
" (a) Quantity and Quality of rock, mineral or
timber in place and the per ton or unit value thereof
cannot be multiplied out to give market value; nor
may it be valued separate from the land. '* * *
The separate valuation of timber or rock attached
to land, or valuations arrived at by a process of multiplying the number of cubic feet or yards by a given
price per unit, are not approved bases for evaluation.
United States [ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority]
v. Indian Creek Marble Co., D. C., 40 F. Supp. 811.
* * *' United States v. 13.40 Acres, D. C. Cal.
1944, 56 F. Supp. 535, at page 538. From the facts
of that case, the experts for the landowner did exactly the thing shown in the quote, namely multiplied the yards by a given price and arrived at a
valuation. The court properly granted a motion for
a new trial. * * *
"* * * In National Brick Co. v. United
States, 1942, 76 U. S. App. D. C. 329, 131 F. 2d 30,
the land in question contained a sand bank containing 300,000 cubic yards of pure sand. The court
prevented the landowners' expert from giving testimony concerning the value per ton of the sand from
the bank, as to whether he had bought sand of the
same quality and what he had paid for it, and as to
the value of the land with the sand. The court limited the testimony to the fair market value of the
property for land as real estate. The judgment was
reversed and remanded for a new trial. The circuit
court said, 131 F. 2d at page 31:
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"'* * * And we know of no other evidence by which the jury could be properly
guided in determining the value of the property
than to be told the per ton value of the sand as
it lay, or, without this knowledge, how the jury
could ever have reached a judgment based on
anything more than guess or speculation. * * *'
"The court in its concluding paragraph, said,
131 F. 2d at page 32:
" '* * * We think the inquiry should
have been whether the property was valuable in
the open market for the sale of sand or for the
use of sand in the making of bricks; and that
in order to reach a fair conclusion in this respect the jury should have been informed by
competent witnesses as to the quantity of the
sand, the quality of the sand, the uses to which
it might be put, whether there was a market for
it, and the value of the land with the sand in
that market in its then condition. * * *'

"This final statement we think to be a correct
statement of law and the resulting decision correct.
We cannot agree with the earlier portion of the opinion if it purports to say that the fair market value
of the sand in place could be presented to the jury,
separate and apart from the valuation of the land
itself.
"It is something totally different to permit an
expert to inform a jury, that one factor considered
was the amount of sand in place and its price per
ton. This is the presentation of a factor which might
well have been considered in the market place, and
is not independent evidence of the fair market value
of the sand. * * *

"* * * In Cade v. United States, 4 Cir.,
1954, 213 F. 2d 138, 141, the court found error
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in the exclusion of testimony of experts who testified there was a deposit of granite rock on the
ground which was reasonably worth $25,000. The
court said: '* * * There was no reason why
their testimony as to the value of the deposit of
rock should not have been admitted for consideration by the jury in estimating the value of the land
taken. * * *' The court also cited with approval National Brick Co. v. United States, supra.
"The fourth circuit had earlier permitted the
separate value of timber to be stated, apart from the
value of the land, including the timber thereon,
United States v. 5139.5 Acres, etc., 4 Cir., 1952, 200
F. 2d 659, 661.
"We think the better rule is stated by the fifth,
sixth and seventh circuits. Georgia Kaolin Co. v.
United States, 5 Cir., 1954, 214 F. 2d 284, at page
286, states:
" 'In eminent domain proceedings, the existence of valuable mineral deposits in the condemned land constitutes an element which may
be taken into consideration if and in so far as
it influences the market value of the land. The
reason for this rule is said to be that the measure of compensation in such cases is the market value of the land to be condemned, taken
as a whole and with due consideration of all
the components that tend to make its market
value. This rule has been applied to limestone,
deposits, gold ore, fire clay, coal, stone, and sand
and gravel, 156 A. L. R. 1416-1417; but there
can be no recovery for both the value of the
land and its mineral deposits as two separate
items. Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. Georgia Ry.
& Electric Co., 132 Ga. 537, 64 S. E. 563; United
States v. 620.00 Acres of Land, etc., D. C., 101
F. Supp. 686; Orgel on Valuation, under Emi-
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nent Domain, page 544, rejecting the method
of estimating the amount of stone in situ and
multiplying this amount by a fixed price per
unit; also citing Searle v. Lackawanna and
Bloomsburg Railroad Co., 33 Pa. 57. In rejecting the method of multiplying the estimated
amount of clay by a fixed price per unit, the
conclusion is largely based on its speculativeness. In discussing this point, the court below
said that whether or not the deposits would be
mined and the royalties paid would depend upon
the condition of the market, the uncertainty of
the future, the demand for the product, "and
many other elements, on and on, in the future."'

"United States v. Meyer, 7 Cir., 1940, 113 F. 2d
387, at page 397, states:
" 'Likewise the value of timber growing
upon the land was immaterial. The test is the
value of the real estate as a whole and separate
valuation of the timber would necessitate another valuation of the land thereof. All of the
facts and circumstances bearing upon the condition and nature of the land as a whole and its
possible use are proper as elements bearing
upon value, but separate appraisements of the
different elements constituting the whole are
improper.' Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United
States, 6 Cir., 1937, 91 F. 2d 884, 887-888.
"* * *
"* * * Conclusions.
"From the foregoing we would summarize the
law as follows:
" ( 1) that a landowner in dealing with a parcel of land on which there is a mineral, timber or
like substance may not introduce expert testimony
by which the expert multiplies the gross material
present by the market value per unit thereof and
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thereby arrives at a figure which purports to be fair
market value for the parcel; * * *
"* * * (3) that the landowner is entitled
to have an expert or lay witness describe the commodity or substance on the land, the quantity thereof, the going price thereof as factors only, upon
which the expert may in part base his value as to
the fair market value of the parcel in question; that
a landowner is not entitled to present testimony as
to the fair market value of the mineral or timber or
other substance apart from the value of the land.
Insofar as Clark, Cade and National Brick cases,
supra, may so hold or indicate to the contrary, we
find ourselves in disagreement therewith ; that if
the holding of N atio'J'lal Brick, supra, is restricted
to the portion quoted in this memorandum, which
portion is the concluding paragraph of the opinion,
we are not in disagreement with National Brick. In
other words, a clear distinction must be drawn between what is presented and considered as a factor
underlying the expert's opinion as contrasted with
opinion as to the fair market value of the substance,
timber or mineral itself, apart from the land. * * *
"* * * As in all cases involving the opinion
of the expert as to fair market value, the jury should
be instructed that the factors considered by the expert are not in themselves direct evidence of the
fair n1arket value of the land condemned, but may
be considered by the jury only for the purpose of
determining what weight, if any, the jury accords to
the testimony of the expert in his ultimate opinion
as to the fair market value of the land in question
as of the date of taking."
Finally, we think the statement in petitioners' brief
in Point VII thereof, made as follows:
"At the time of trial, the appellant made no
objection that the respondents were endeavoring to
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establish the value of the land by multiplying the
quantity of sand by the price per ton."
is manifestly unfair to the record. The objections made to
the testimony of the experts Howa, (R. 256, 7, 8) Gaddis
(R. 275), though they might have been more clearly and
better made, went to the very fact that these wttnesses
were using a purely mathematical means of computation
to arrive at a value.
We do not deny that the State's experts were permitted
to express themselves also as to the quantity, quality and
value per yard of the materials; and it appears from the
testimony and the exhibits that the fair market value arrived at by these appraisers also amounted to a mathematical computation together with a process of addition of other
values. Admitting then that in the trial of this cause a
clear distinction was not drawn between what was presented
as a factor underlying the experts' opinions as to fair market value and as to their opinion of the fair market value,
we submit that such error can only be rectified through the
process of a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Petition for rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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